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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
PHIL L. HANSEN, Attorney General of the
State of Utah,
·
Plaintiff-Appel1ant,
v.

CASE NO.

LEGAL SERVICES COMMITTEE OF THE
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE,

10784

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, the Attorney General of the State
of Utah, appeals from a decision of the district court
of the Third Judicial District, the Honorable Bryant
H. Croft, Judge, ruling that the provisions of Senate
Bill No. 4 as enacted by the 36th Utah State Legisldture was constitutional and not in contravention of
the provisions of Article VII, Section 18, of the Constitution of the State of Utah pertaininq to the powers
and duties of the Attorney General.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
ih0

The appellant filed suit in the district court of
Thirrl T11rlkia 1 District on Tune 24, 1966, challi=mg

2
ing the constitutionalJty of Senate Bill No. 4 as enacted by the 36th Utah State Legislature, 2nd Special Session which established the Joint Legal Services Committee and legal advisor for the legislature of the State of Utah. A motion to dismiss was
filed by the respondents and on the 4th day of November, 1966, an order was entered by the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge, granting the respondent's motion to dismiss and determining that the
contention of the Attorney General as to the constitutionality as to the reference legislature were without merit.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant submits that the decision of the
district court should be reversed and this court
should rule that the provisions of Senate Bill No. 4,
36th Utah State Legislature, Section 3, Chapter 7,
Laws of Utah, 1966, 2nd S.S., are unconstitutional.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 24, 1966, the appellant, the Attorney
General of the State of Utah, filed suit in the District
Court of Salt Lake County, against Senator Charles
Welch, Jr., Senator Richard V. Evans, Representative Felshaw King, and Representative Allan E.
Mecham, Legislators of the Utah State Legislature,
comprising the Joint Legal Services Committee of
the Utah State Legislature. It was alleged that the
legislation establishing the committee and providing for the office of leqa 1 advisor to the legislature

3
wa.s unconstitutional. The legislation wa.s enacted
a.s Senate Bill No. 4 by the 36th Uta.h State Legislature (R. 5-6). The duties of the legal advisor a.re to
prepare legislative measures, review legislative
measures a.nd "give such legal advice and assistance concerning any measure before the legislature" when requested to do so. (Emphasis added.)
The Legal advisor is a.lso charged with the formulation of plans for codification a.nd revision of state
statutes. The Attorney General, in his complaint
m. 1), alleged tha.t the legislation contravened the
provisions of Article VII, Section 18, of the Constitution of the State of Utah providing that the Attorney
Genera.I shall be the legal advisor for all state officers (R. 2). (Emphasis added.) The Attorney General
contended tha.t the legislation usurped the constitutional duties and functions of the Attorney General in acting as legal advisor to the legislature because the legislators were state officers. It is further
contended that the establishment of the legal advisor to the State Legislature usurped the statutmy
duties and functions of the Attorney General. On
July 23, 1966, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint of the Attorney General alleging that the allegations of the Attorney General
were unmeritorious in that if his contentions were
correct provisions of Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution of the State of Utah providing for the separation of powers would be violated. The respondents also contended that the terms "state officers"
applied only to executive officers and that the legislature was free to hire its own officers and em-

4

mcludmg a legal advisor. Jt wa.s ±urtht71
contended that if the Attorney General's position
were correct his office would in effect interfere
with the judiciary and that it was not the intention
of the constitutional framers to so empower the Attorney General as to preclude the legislature from
employing its own counsel. Finally, the respondents
contended that such construction was contrary to
the "practice" in other states. The matter was held
before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, District Judge,
on October 11, 1966, c:nd on November 4, 1956,
Judge Croft entered a memorandum of the decision
and a judgment ordering that the "plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed". Judge Croft concluded
that the Attorney General was not vested with common law powers, but that the separation of power
provisions of the Constitution were not violated, but
that the provisions of the Utah Constitution establishing the office of the Attorney General and defining his powers did not encompass legislative officers and that the leq]slature was not otherwise eY.·
eluded from employing a legal advisor.
ployee~,

Subsequent to Judge Croft's order the appellant
perfected this appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROVISIONS OF SENATE BILL NO. 4, LAWS
OF UTAH 1966, CHAPTER 7, SECTION 3, 2ND S.S.
ESTABLISHINC THE OFFICE OF LECISL\TfVE ADVISOR ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THAT THEY
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CONTHAVENE THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VII,
SECTION 18, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE
OF UTAH PROVIDING THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SHALL BE THE LEGAL ADVISOR FOR STATE
OFFICERS.

A. SEPARATION OF POWERS
The respondents in the motion to dismiss in the
trial court relied, in part, upon a claim that the Attorney General's construction of Article VII, § 18 of
Utah Constitution would do violence to the concept
of separation of powers and be contrary to Article
V, § 1 of the Constitution. The trial court apparently
did not consider that argument valid, since it did
mention that argument as a basis for its decision.
Although no cross-appeal has been filed, the appellant wishes to lay to rest any contention that Article
VII, ~ 18, of the Utah Constitution, making the Attorney General the exclusive legal advisor for the members of the Legislature, would violate the concept
of separation of powers.
Article VII,

§

18, provides:

"The Attorney-General shall be the legal adviser of
the State officers, and shall perform such other duties
as may be provided by law." (Emphasis added)

Article V,
vides:

§

l, of the Utah Constitution also pro-

"The powers of the government of the State of Utah
shall be divided into three distinct departments, the
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial: and no
person charged with the exercise of powers properly
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belonging to oue of these uepartments, shall exen:1sc·
any functions appertaining to either of the others,
except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted."

The Attorney General in acting as a legal advisor to the members of the Legislature does not exercise legislative power: to the contrary, he performs the traditional function that an Attorney General has always performed, that of giving legal advice to public officers. At common law the attorney
general sat with Parliament and was its adviser on
legal matters. Holdsworth, A History of English La_w,
Vol. 6, pp. 458-481 (1924); Beilot, The Origin of the
Attorney General. 25 L. Q. R. 400 (1909). There is no
conflict in the fact that the attorney general advises
the members of the Leoislature and Article V, § 1.
Legal advice and guid:ince is not the exercise of
legislative power. The Attorney General gives h~s
legal advice to the judiciary as well when called
upon to do so, Article V, § 1, was never intended to
create three completely autonomous bodies, but
merely three separate branches of government that
had made up the traditional governmental structure
in this country.m Madison commented on the concept in The Federalist, No. XLVII Vol. l, p. 331 (Cent
L. Jed 1916):

"* * ~' he [Montesquie I did not mean that these departments ought to have no PARTIAL AGENCY in,
or no CONTROL over, the acts of each other. Hi:o
(1)

The very argument respondent made on thi5 point w_ould mean no
checks and balances and prevent government from workmg. Hand. ThP
Bill of Rights.

7
111eamng, as his own words import, and still more conclusively as illustrated by the example in his eye, can
amount to no more than this, that where the
WHOLE power of one department is exercised by
the same hands which possess the WHOLE power of
another department, the fundamental principles of a
free constitution are subverted. ':' * *"

This court clearly recognized the same limitations in Article V, § 1, in Tite v. State Tax Commission, 89 Utah 404, 57 P. 2d 734 (1936), holding that
the Tax Commission could exercise certain quasi
judicial powers, but not absolute judicial power.
The court stated:
"It was Montesquieu in his Esprit des Lois who
crystalized the theory of separation of powers to the
degree we have it in our Federal and State Constitutions. But even here, as stated in Bouvier's Dictionary (Rawles 3d Rev.) p. 1114, 'The absolute independence of the three branches of government which
was advocated by Montesquieu has not been found
entirely practicable, and, although the threefold division of powers is the basis of the American Constitution, there are many cases in which the duties of one
department are to a certain extent devolved upon and
shared by the other.' In Brown v. Turner, 70 N.C.
93, the court said, 'r Although 1 the executive, legislative and supreme judicial powers of the government
ought to be forever separate and distinct. it is also
true that the science of government is a practical
one; therefore, while each should firmly maintain
the essential powers belonging to it, it cannot be
forgotten that the three co-ordinate parts constitute
one brotherhood, whose common trust requires a
mutual toleration of the occupancy of what seems
to be a 'common cause of vicinage,' bordering the
domains of each'."
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Clearly, the simple rendering o± legal advice to
members of the Legislature by the Attorney General
does not encroach on the Legislative prerogatives
and in no way transgresses Article V, § 1 of the Utah
Constitution. Therefore, there is nothing that would
prevent this court from saying that Article VII, § 18,
makes the Attorney General the exclusive legal adviser for members of the Legislature.

B.

THE PLAIN MEANING OF ARTICLE VIL
§ 18.

It is submitted that the plain meaning of Article
VII,§ 18, renders the Attorney General the exclusive
legal adviser to the members of the Legislature and
that the provisions of Section 3, Chapter 7, Laws of
Utah 1966, Second Special Session, purporting to
establish the office of legal adviser to the Legislature
is unconstitutional.

Article VII, § 18 does not state that the Attorney
Genearl may be the Legislature's legal adviser or
that he is a legal adviser for state officers, rather, it
specifically enjoined that he shall be "the" legal adviser of the State officers. At the time the Utah Constitution was promulgated the position of Attorney
General was not without historical significance. The
Act of March 18, 1852, established the office of At
torney General of the Territory of Utah. This Act
was upheld in Snow v. United States. 85 U.S. 317,
(1873). However, in 1874, Congress repealed the
prior law and the position was abolished. Compiled
Laws of Utah 1876, p. 51. The Constitutional Con-
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cons1dered the position, and seemed to mdicate the primary function would be advising state
officers, and contemplated that other functions could
be provided by the Legislature. Proceedings of the
Constitution Convention 1895, Vol. II, pp. 1028-1030,
pp. 1154. The only affirmative dutv the Constitution
expressly obligates the Attorney General to perform
is that of being "the" legal adviser to state officers.
Certainly, in view of the discussion of salaries, etc.,
during the convention it could hardly be said the
framers intended the Legislature to hire its own
legal adviser.
vent1011

The trial court seemed to place great emphasis
upon the contention tha_t legislators were not "State
Officers," as that term is used in Article VII, § 18.
Nothing in the convention proceedings supports
that conclusion. The term "State Officers" is used in
Article XXIV, § 12, to include legislators. That section provides:
"The State Officers to be voted for at the time of
the adoption of this Constitution, shall be a Governor, Secretary of State, State Auditor, State Treasurer, Attorney-General, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Members of the Senate and House of Rep·
resentatives, three Supreme Judges nine District
Judges, and a Representative to Congress." (Emphasis added.)

Consequently, it cannot be profitably argued
that the term "State Officers" was intended only to
cover executive officers. The term "state officer" has
in many contexts been held to include members of

lU

the Legislature. In re Anderson, l b4 Wis. l, 1o~ N. VV.

559; Brown v. Superior Court, 81 Ariz. 236, 303 P. 2d
990; Jones v. Lockhart, 76 Ariz. 390, 265 P. 2d 447:
Pitts v. Chilton County, 27 Ala. App. 364, 173 So. 94:
Rich v. Industrial Commission, 36 Cal. App. 2d 628 .
98 P. 2d 249. It would seem to be an unnecessary and
dubious play on semantics and constitutional interpretation to contend that members of the legislature
are not "State Officers" within the meaning of Article
VII, § 18 and therefore, the Attorney General is "the"
legal adviser to members of the Legislature.
In McCormick v. Thatcher, 8 Utah 294, 30 Pac.
1091 (1892), the court decided that the members of
the Board of Trustees of the State Agricultural College were state officers. The court carefully defined
the elements of being an "officer" and did so in
terms of the duties and powers exercised. This case
was decided shortly before the Constitution Convention and, it is submitted, would lend support to
the conclusion that the term "State Officers," as used
in Article VII, § 18, was intended to encompass all
officials exercising the sovereign powers of the
State. This necessarily includes members of the
Legislature. Consequently, the plain meaning of the
term "State Officers" requires that members of the
Legislature be included within its scope. It seems
inescapable not to conclude that the Attorney General is, by constitutional mandate, "the" legal adviser to the members of the Legislature.
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C. INTERFERENCE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL
OBLIGATIONS AND PREROGATIVES.

A substantial portion of the trial court's memorandum was directed to the question of common
law powers of the Attorney General. Then the trial
court concluded (R. 33):
"The answer to the issue hereinvolved does not turn
on what powers an Attorney General did or did not
have at common law ... "

Appellant agrees. Such was relevant below
only on the question of separation of powers, an
issue already resolved against respondents. The
trial court determined that the Constitution, Article
VII, § 18, did not prevent the enactment of Senate
Bill, No. 4, Section 3, Chap. 7, Laws of Utah 1966, 2nd
S.S. It is submitted the trial court erred. As has
been noted Article VIL § 18 specifically enjoins the
Attorney General to act as "the" legal adviser for
"State Officers," and the members of the Legislature are "State Officers."
The issue is, then, whether or not the Legislature
may establish some other person or body to perform the duty and obligation the Constitution of the
State vests in the Attorney General. The answer
seems to be obviously not. Article VII, § 18, really
contains two parts. The first makes the Attorney
General "the" legal adviser for "State Officers." The
second empowers the Legislature to legislate on
matters concerning the duties of the Attorney GenrC>rn l other than as leqa 1 adviser for "State Offir'Ars"
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The Legislature may impose what authorized obligations it will on the Attorney General, but it may
not replace him with someone else as respects the
Constitutional obligation to act as legal adviser to
state officers. To allow the Legislature to do what it
is attempting to do by Senate Bill 4, the first portion
of Article VII, § 18 is effectively emasculated. The
question here is not the power of an agency to employ counsel to conduct litigation. Rather this case
involves the express power and obligation constitutionally imposed on the Attorney General to act as
"the" legal adviser. If the farmers of the Constitution
had intended the Legislature to be able to substitute
someone for the Attorney General as legal adviser,
the language of Article VII, § 18, relating to the Attorney General as "the" legal adviser could have
been deleted and the Attorney General charged
with performing only the duties the Legislature sav1
fit to authorize. By not so providing, the framers of
the Constitution must have intended the specific
language to be the one area the Legislature could
not change by legislation. Where the instant legislation is directly inconsistent with the constitutionctl
mandate it must fall as being in conflict with Article
VII, § 18. If the Legislature were to be permitted to
hire its own Attorney General, consistency and
logic would likewise permit it to hire its own Governor, Auditor, Treasurer, Secretary of State, and
Judges. The intended encroachment by the Legislature into the executive branch of state government
can not be permitted. The next step would be into
thP iurlidal branch. Then. them wou kl hP no sPp?i
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ration of powers. Then, there would be no democracy. Instead there would be an all-powerful single
branch of government bordering on the fringe of
monarchy. Our constitution and courts are our only
safeguards against a dictatorial legislature. Those
Constitutional provisions must be honored and preserved.

CONCLUSION
The office of Attorney General of the State of
Utah is an important constitutional office. Generally
the duties the Attorney General must perform may
be set by statute, although the Attorney General
may have common law powers also. However,
Article VII, § 18, requires that the Attorney General
perform one specific duty, that of being the legal
adviser to "State Officers." The members of the Legislature are state officers. The Legislature has attempted to have the obligations of the Attorney General performed by someone else. This is contrary
to the express mandate of the Utah Constitution.
Consequently, this court should reverse the tric.l
court and rule that Sena.te Bill 4, Section 3, Chap. 7,
1.nws of Utah, 1966, 2ncl. S.S. is unconstitutional.
RONALD N. BOYCE

Special Assistant Attorney
General
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attornev for Appellant

